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DUE PROCESS WITHOUT JUDICIAL PROCESS?:  
ANTIADVERSARIALISM 
IN AMERICAN LEGAL CULTURE 
Norman W. Spaulding* 
 
[T]he real realm of injustice is not in an amoral and prelegal state of 
nature.  It does not appear only on those rare occasions when a political 
order wholly collapses.  It does not stand outside the gate of even the best 
of known states.  Most injustices occur continuously within the framework 
of an established polity with an operative system of law, in normal times.  
Often it is the very people who are supposed to prevent injustice who, in 
their official capacity, commit the gravest acts of injustice, without much 
protest from the citizenry.1 
I.  THE SOURCES OF ANTIADVERSARIALISM 
For decades now, American scholars of procedure and legal ethics have 
remarked upon the death of the jury trial.  If jury trial is not in fact dead as 
an institution for the resolution of disputes, it is certainly “vanishing.”2  
Even in complex litigation, courts tend to facilitate nonadjudicative 
resolutions—providing sites for aggregation, selection of counsel, fact 
gathering, and finality (via issue and claim preclusion)—rather than trial on 
the merits in any conventional sense of the term.3  In some high-stakes 
criminal cases and a fraction of civil cases, jury trial will surely continue 
well into the twenty-first century.  Wall-to-wall media coverage of the more 
sensational of these will continue as well; Americans have a very long and 
 
*  Sweitzer Professor of Law, Stanford Law School.  I am grateful to the Fordham Law 
Review’s editors for assistance bringing this Article to publication, to Bruce Green and 
Russell Pearce for the invitation to contribute to the colloquium entitled Civil Litigation 
Ethics at a Time of Vanishing Trials held at Fordham University School of Law, to the other 
colloquium participants for their helpful feedback, to my able research assistant Joe DeMott, 
and, as always, to Ticien Sassoubre for help in every phase of the Article’s development.  
For an overview of the colloquium, see Judith Resnik, Lawyers’ Ethics Beyond the 
Vanishing Trial:  Unrepresented Claimants, De Facto Aggregations, Arbitration Mandates, 
and Privatized Processes, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899 (2017). 
 
 1. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, THE FACES OF INJUSTICE 19 (1990). 
 2. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial:  An Examination of Trials and Related 
Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004). 
 3. Emery G. Lee III et al., Multidistrict Centralization:  An Empirical Examination, 12 
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 211, 222 (2015) (noting an increased rate of multidistrict 
litigation relative to class actions). 
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deeply ingrained habit of treating trials as a form of public entertainment.4  
But as a widespread legal and cultural practice—one that people experience 
as active participants, and one that plays a fundamental role in the 
administration of justice—jury trial is indeed vanishing. 
Some scholars view the disappearance of jury trials in civil cases as a 
Seventh Amendment crisis, the product of a gradual but systematic and 
unconstitutional redistribution of decision-making authority from juries to 
judges over the last 175 years.5  Judges, on this account, are not only 
“managerial”6 but increasingly imperial.7 
On the other hand, legal historians remind us that even at its apogee in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, jury trials accounted for around 
one-third of dispositions in the state courts.8  Long before the Federal 
Arbitration Act and more recent innovations, private settlement and 
alternative mechanisms for dispute resolution played a more significant role 
than the lore surrounding jury trials would suggest.9  We also know that 
concerns about the cost and delay of litigation animated well-founded and 
vituperative criticisms of the adversary system from the very earliest days 
of the republic.  These critiques motivated the exploration and endorsement 
of alternatives.10  And we know that Americans have a deep, sometimes 
quite baleful, commitment to vigilantism and other forms of self-help.11 
Still, there is more than a little truth in the judicial imperialism critique.  
Settlement and alternative dispute resolution have become default modes of 
disposition.  Judges not only defer to these alternatives and use pretrial 
procedures to promote them, they increasingly force parties to use them and 
have, for the most part, blinked at commentary revealing evidence of 
profound defects in them.12  Nor is there any gainsaying the gradual 
 
 4. On the popularity of trials as entertainment in early American history, see CARL R. 
LOUNSBURY, THE COURTHOUSES OF EARLY VIRGINIA:  AN ARCHITECTURAL HISTORY 5 
(2005).  On trials and American popular consciousness, see Carol J. Clover, Law and the 
Order of Popular Culture, in LAW IN THE DOMAINS OF CULTURE 97, 110 (Austin Sarat & 
Thomas R. Kearns eds., 2000).  
 5. See generally SUJA A. THOMAS, THE MISSING AMERICAN JURY:  RESTORING THE 
FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE CRIMINAL, CIVIL, AND GRAND JURIES (2016). 
 6. See generally Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982). 
 7. See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007); see also Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose 
Eyes Are You Going to Believe?:  Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 
122 HARV. L. REV. 837 (2009). 
 8. See Galanter, supra note 2, at 465 (gathering civil trial data); see also George Fisher, 
Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857 (2000). 
 9. See generally Amalia D. Kessler, Deciding Against Conciliation:  The Nineteenth-
Century Rejection of a European Transplant and the Rise of a Distinctively American Ideal 
of Adversarial Adjudication, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 423 (2009). 
 10. Norman W. Spaulding, The Luxury of the Law:  The Codification Movement and the 
Right to Counsel, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 991–92 (2004). 
 11. Norman W. Spaulding, The Impersonation of Justice:  Lynching, Dueling, and 
Wildcat Strikes in Nineteenth-Century America, in THE ROUTLEDGE RESEARCH COMPANION 
TO LAW AND HUMANITIES IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (Nan Goodman & Simon Stern 
eds., 2017). 
 12. See, e.g., Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010); Vaden v. Discover 
Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2009); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); Wright 
v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 
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reallocation of authority from jury to judge through the expansion of 
procedural tools that enable judges to remove cases from the jury during 
trial and to dispose of cases before trial by substituting the judge’s 
assessment of the facts for the jury’s.13  The heady days of jury supremacy 
at the founding of the republic—when both questions of law and fact were 
within their purview and when trial before a new jury was the primary 
appellate remedy—are so distant as to seem part of an altogether foreign 
regime of dispute resolution. 
But the imperialism critique frequently misses the extent to which 
skepticism about the adversary system is itself rooted in Jacksonian populist 
and New Deal progressive political movements.  Nineteenth-century 
populists loathed the intricacies and elitism of common law adjudication.14  
The codification movement they supported was directed at creating a more 
democratically legitimate and responsive system of substantive and 
procedural law—a system in which access to law would not depend on 
access to counsel.15  As my colleague Amalia Kessler has shown, some 
communities explored radical alternatives to the adversary system.16  Jury 
trial may have many democratic virtues, but in the eyes of antebellum 
populist reformers, it came along with heavy antidemocratic baggage. 
Modern proceduralists often celebrate the development of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) and the innovations Dean Charles Clark 
built into the framework of the rules to make federal litigation more 
accessible to ordinary litigants (through the merger of law and equity, the 
short, plain statement rule for pleading, open-handed discovery, liberal 
joinder, etc.).17  But, in their pedagogy and research agendas, proceduralists 
focus intensely and almost exclusively on the bare fraction of civil cases 
 
500 U.S. 20 (1991); see also Deborah R. Hensler, Suppose It’s Not True:  Challenging 
Mediation Ideology, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 81, 82 (noting that judges impose mediation on 
litigants).  For a summary of the standard critiques of alternative dispute resolution, see 
Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, Mediation, Arbitration, and Alternative Dispute Resolution 
(ADR), in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (James 
D. Wright ed., 2015); Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration Clauses Prevent 
Consumers from Presenting Procedurally Difficult Claims, 42 SW. L. REV. 87, 87 n.1 (2012) 
(gathering commentary); Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a 
‘Privatization of the Justice System,’ N.Y. TIMES:  DEALBOOK (Nov. 1, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-of-the-
justice-system.html [perma.cc/6JKA-4ZZM]; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, 
Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES:  DEALBOOK  
(Oct. 31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-
everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/MH64-DJW9]. 
 13. On the expansion of summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law, compare 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), with Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 
(1943), and Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).  On screening complaints for 
“plausibility” based on trial judges’ “common sense,” see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 
664, 670 (2009). 
 14. Spaulding, supra note 10, at 986–87.  
 15. See generally CHARLES M. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT:  A 
STUDY OF ANTEBELLUM LEGAL REFORM (1981). 
 16. See Kessler, supra note 9, at 449. 
 17. See, e.g., Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law:  The Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987). 
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decided in federal courts, leaving largely unexamined the norms and rules 
governing the tens of millions of cases affecting the lives of ordinary 
Americans in state courts and state and federal agencies.18  Moreover, 
proceduralists typically fail to read Dean Clark’s innovations against a 
larger backdrop of hostility to the courts among New Dealers and perhaps 
especially among the New Deal lawyers who would rise to the bench and 
elite positions in the executive branch.19 
That hostility was real.  Lochner-era laissez-faire jurisprudence and 
judicial procedures, such as the antistrike injunction that had been used to 
thwart the labor movement, were fresh in their minds.20  The issue was not 
just the lingering effect of reservations among Justices of the U.S. Supreme 
Court in the 1930s regarding the Article I Commerce Clause powers of 
Congress to respond to the Great Depression.21  There was a broader 
feeling, sharpened by the antistrike injunction experience, that the adversary 
system itself (in its ethics, its procedures, and in the professional identity of 
lawyers) was an obstacle to sensible democratic governance and 
progressive reform.22  To read the FRCP in context, then, is to remember 
that Congress passed the Rules Enabling Act23 in the same year that it 
passed the Securities Exchange Act of 193424 (“the 1934 Act”) and a year 
before it passed the National Labor Relations Act.25  These statutes express 
the deeper vision of New Deal reformers, one in which litigation would be 
reduced to a subordinate role in American law.  Law in the first instance 
was to be generated, interpreted, and applied to social action in and through 
administrative agencies, not courts. 
Both pieces of legislation established a new executive branch agency 
designed to regulate an area of primary economic action.26  The Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB) were authorized to promulgate rules, investigate violations, initiate 
enforcement actions, and, in some cases, to be the court of first instance.27  
Together with the Securities Act of 1933 (“the 1933 Act”), the 1934 Act 
was read to permit private rights of action, which require an Article III 
 
 18. Even in administrative law, the actual mechanics of administration are often ignored 
in favor of abstract constitutional and theoretical inquiry.  There are, of course, notable 
exceptions. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of 
Administrative Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1137 (2014).  
 19. See generally PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS (1982). 
 20. See generally FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 
(1930). 
 21. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 22. These ideas are distilled in the quintessential New Deal lawyer-turned-judge Jerome 
Frank’s lacerating critique of the adversary system. See JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL:  
MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE (1949).   
 23. Ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012)). 
 24. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 3, 48 Stat. 881, 885 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78d). 
 25. See National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended 
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169). 
 26. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78d. 
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 78d; 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169. 
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forum for adjudication,28 but the core work of enforcement, particularly the 
calibration of enforcement policy, was supposed to rest squarely with the 
agency.29  The 1933 Act complemented this agency-centric regulatory 
approach through information-forcing disclosure provisions refined by 
agency rulemaking.30  The hope and expectation was that the act of 
registration and preparation of associated securities disclosures would have 
deep behavioral consequences in the financial markets.  From a structural 
and regulatory standpoint then, judicial enforcement was tertiary to 
disclosure and the agency’s policy-based rulemaking.  No one imagined 
that judicial enforcement would be unnecessary, but there is a fundamental 
difference between the structure of the 1933 and 1934 Acts on the one hand, 
and, legislation that merely establishes substantive rights or regulatory 
limits while leaving enforcement to private actors and the Department of 
Justice (DOJ)—a court-centric approach.31 
The very highest ambitions of the New Deal reformers to circumvent 
judicial review are apparent in the operation of the NLRB.32  Established to 
protect the rights of workers to form unions and engage in collective 
bargaining, the NLRB is composed of five members appointed by the 
President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to five-year terms.33  
Initial adjudications of labor disputes are conducted before administrative 
law judges with appeals to a three-member panel of the Board.34  The 
NLRB’s general counsel is responsible for filing complaints either on her 
own initiative or after receiving allegations of unfair labor practices from 
employees.35  Fearful that the work of the NLRB would be undermined by 
unsympathetic judges, the NLRB very quickly developed a set of practices 
that diminished the likelihood that its adjudications would be subject to 
judicial review.36  As Peter Low and John Jeffries note: 
Interestingly, although the NLRB also has rule-making authority, it is 
notoriously reluctant to use it.  Despite repeated pleas from judges, 
practitioners, and academics, the Board consistently eschews formal rule-
making in favor of case-by-case adjudication.  The reasons for this 
practice may be many, but one factor repeatedly cited by experts is the 
agency’s desire to insulate itself from effective judicial review by 
submerging its judgments in the facts of particular cases.  Perhaps not 
entirely unrelated is the widespread perception that NLRB adjudication is 
ideological and politicized, characterized by sharp swings in enforcement 
 
 28. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983). 
 29. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964); A.C. Pritchard & Robert B. 
Thompson, Securities Law and the New Deal Justices, 95 VA. L. REV. 841 (2009). 
 30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa. 
 31. Reconstruction enforcement legislation of the 1860s and 1870s is a paradigmatic 
example of this court-centric approach. See generally HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. 
WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW (1982). 
 32. This example is drawn from PETER W. LOW & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 320–24 (5th ed. 2004). 
 33. 29 U.S.C. § 153. 
 34. Id. § 160. 
 35. Id. 
 36. LOW & JEFFRIES, JR., supra note 32, at 321. 
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perspective as annual presidential appointments remake the Board’s 
composition. 
 Obviously, the [NLRB] fall[s] very far short of the model of judicial 
independence established by Article III.  Indeed, the Board’s structure 
suggests, and the history of the National Labor Relations Act confirms, 
that the Board was not intended to provide impartial, apolitical 
adjudication of labor disputes.  Instead, it was created to enforce certain 
policy objectives and constituted so that the President, acting with the 
advice and consent of the Senate, can assert relatively short-term political 
control over Board membership.37 
There is a right of appeal to the U.S. courts of appeal if a party believes 
the NLRB’s decision to be erroneous, but by nesting its legal conclusions 
and policy judgments in the facts of individual cases, the NLRB reduces the 
likelihood of reversal on appeal.38  That is because the standard of review 
requires heightened deference as to questions of fact under Crowell v. 
Benson,39 and Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council40 
requires deference with respect to reasonable agency constructions of 
organic statutes.41  To be sure, the Board has no substantive power to 
coerce compliance.  But if aggrieved parties facing these deferential 
standards of review comply rather than appeal to the federal courts, the 
Board’s decisions are final. 
Thus, judicial review in the ostensibly more independent federal courts is 
merely a potential, and almost always post hoc, intervention.42  Law either 
operates in the absence of adjudication as regulated entities conform to 
standards set by Congress, or it takes effect through non-Article III 
adjudications that are responsive to enforcement priorities set by agency 
policymakers and the President.  This is law before the courts, law outside 
the courts, law unhinged from the adversary system and its traditional 
forum. 
If the NLRB’s adjudication practices and avoidance of formal 
rulemaking are somewhat unique, if most agency adjudication and 
rulemaking follows the pathways of notice and comment that enable 
judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, the NLRB example 
is nevertheless a powerful reminder of the New Deal reformer’s first 
principles:  their confidence in, and elevation of, extrajudicial process; their 
suspicion of the adversary system and its traditional forum; and their sense 
of how far the interpretation and application of law needed to be removed 
from traditional structures of adjudication to make New Deal political 
priorities real in the lives of workers and consumers. 
 
 37. Id. at 321–22. 
 38. Id. at 321. 
 39. 285 U.S. 22 (1932). 
 40. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 41. Id. at 844. 
 42. The intervention is post hoc because the NLRB’s submersion of rulemaking in 
adjudication effectively circumvents the structure of notice, comment, and judicial review of 
agency rulemaking embedded in the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
2017] DUE PROCESS WITHOUT JUDICIAL PROCESS? 2255 
The point of all this is not that proceduralists have been wrong to insist 
upon the egalitarian ambitions of Dean Clark or the generous construction 
of the FRCP by the New Deal Supreme Court relative to the Rehnquist and 
Roberts Courts.  Those ambitions were real.  But New Deal innovations in 
the federal law of procedure must also be interpreted against the backdrop 
of a far broader political and legal project explicitly dedicated to the 
displacement, if not the subordination of, the adversary system.  Indeed, 
New Deal reformers, drawing upon standards of internal administrative law 
that run back to the earliest days of the republic, built the modern regulatory 
state on an altogether different theory of the administration of justice.43  
Rational, scientific expertise was to drive not only the resolution of political 
questions into specific policy objectives and associated legal rules but also 
the resolution of discrete disputes about the application of policy to the 
facts of social and economic life.  America was to become a republic of 
experts in which policy would be established and implemented by 
empirically informed, politically responsive technocrats.44  The bench and 
bar were not only to rely upon these technocrats and defer to their judgment 
but to celebrate the virtues of avoiding adjudication in court.45  Indeed, elite 
New Deal lawyers were among the principal architects of the alternative 
theory and leaders in its implementation in the agencies and Congress.46 
As importantly, at least some of the Advisory Committee’s most 
significant innovations in procedure, most obviously the incorporation of 
broad open-handed discovery, can be read as disfavoring trial by providing 
for the disclosure of evidence on terms that encourage settlement and 
summary judgment.  It seems likely that discovery practice—vexed as it has 
become and desperate as modern courts and the Advisory Committee have 
been to restrain it47—has played an important role in diminishing the 
perceived need for trial.48  Notably, in the briefing for Hickman v. Taylor49 
 
 43. JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION:  THE LOST ONE 
HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 218, 251, 279 (2012). 
 44. See H.N. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 41 (1981) (“The scientific 
‘expert’ thus became the central figure in Frankfurter’s plan for government:  it was the 
expert who would study society, accumulate facts, draw conclusions, and educate the public 
as to the rational necessity of those conclusions.  Frankfurter’s was thus a philosophy that 
was both elitist and democratic:  elitist in its demand for expert knowledge; democratic in its 
faith that the public at large was educable.”); see also MICHAEL E. PARRISH, FELIX 
FRANKFURTER AND HIS TIMES:  THE REFORM YEARS 200 (1982).  
 45. On the use of standing doctrine to insulate New Deal agency action, see Daniel E. 
Ho & Erica L. Ross, Did Liberal Justices Invent the Standing Doctrine?:  An Empirical 
Study of the Evolution of Standing, 1921–2006, 62 STAN. L. REV. 591 (2010); Cass R. 
Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan?:  Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 
MICH. L. REV. 163, 179 (1992). 
 46. See generally IRONS, supra note 19.  Progressives also played a larger role than has 
traditionally been assumed in the development of arbitration as an alternative to trial in the 
early twentieth century and in the drafting and passage of the Federal Arbitration Act. See 
generally Amalia D. Kessler, Arbitration and Americanization:  The Paternalism of 
Progressive Procedural Reform, 124 YALE L.J. 2940 (2015).   
 47. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 560 n.6 (2007). 
 48. Richard Marcus, The Story of Hickman:  Preserving Adversarial Incentives While 
Embracing Broad Discovery, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 307, 310 (Kevin M. Clermont 
ed., 2004). 
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before the Supreme Court, it was progressive labor lawyers who argued that 
the new discovery rules were “written with a view toward eliminating the 
adversary system.”50  In the new discovery rules, they saw yet another New 
Deal displacement of the adversary system intended to level the playing 
field between large, information-rich defendants and the injured employees 
who sued them.  Corporate defense counsel, who typically enjoy early 
access to relevant witnesses and documentary evidence, would be obliged 
to disclose their findings to promote “[m]utual knowledge of all the relevant 
facts.”51  In creating the doctrine of work product protection, the Court 
squarely rejected the argument that the discovery rules were designed to 
eliminate the adversary system.52  But it did so not because it could locate a 
decisive rebuttal in the FRCP or the Rules Enabling Act.53  To defend work 
product protection, the Court turned to a Burkean theory that adversary 
traditions could not be set aside by mere implication.54  The “historical and 
the necessary way in which lawyers act within the framework of our system 
of jurisprudence,” Justice William Murphy wrote for the majority, could not 
be upset by the discovery rules.55 
Finally, it must be said that while progressive academics have long 
decried the barriers to access to counsel for low-income Americans, legal 
ethics scholars who share that concern have, for more than four decades, 
spearheaded a comprehensive assault on the adversary system and the moral 
integrity of the legal profession.56  The ethicists’ critiques are rivaled only 
by a public relations and lobbying campaign of the corporate bar and its 
clients designed to convince the American people (and sitting judges) that 
jury trial is corrupt because it provides windfall gains to plaintiffs’ lawyers 
and litigants with frivolous claims.57  Legal ethics scholars generally have 
 
 49. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). 
 50. Marcus, supra note 48, at 307 (emphasis added) (quoting Petition and Brief of the 
United Railroad Workers of America, C.I.O., for Leave to File the Same, Amicus Curiae at 
2, Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (No. 47)). 
 51. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 507. 
 52. Id. at 507–09. 
 53. See id. at 505. 
 54. See id. at 518–19. 
 55. Id. at 511.  
 56. See ETHICS IN PRACTICE:  LAWYERS’ ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION 
(Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000); DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE:  AN ETHICAL STUDY 
67–68 (1988) (describing faith in the adversary system as grounded in “superstition” and 
arguing that it is not “capable of underwriting institutional excuses for lawyers” to avoid the 
requirements of common morality); William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy:  
Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 33–34 (“[T]o take the 
value of individuality seriously would require the abandonment of the Ideology of Advocacy 
and of legal professionalism.  Indeed . . . respect for the value of law itself may require the 
repudiation of legal professionalism.”). 
  Even among progressive lawyers of color, especially those concerned with legal 
ethics, the traditional principal-agent structure of the attorney-client relationship, the 
traditional use of the courts in the civil rights movement, and even cause lawyering more 
broadly have been subjected to withering criticism. See, e.g., GERALD P. LÓPEZ, REBELLIOUS 
LAWYERING:  ONE CHICANO’S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992). 
 57. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE:  REFORMING THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 121 (2000) (describing distorted media coverage and political debate regarding 
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been concerned with precisely the opposite substantive issue—that windfall 
gains go to the “haves” at the expense of the “have-nots”58— but both sides 
are convinced that the adversary system is deeply flawed and that adversary 
values inhibit the proper resolution of disputes. 
Should we really be surprised that jury trial has been withering away in 
this inhospitable climate?  Responsibility for the current state of affairs 
certainly cannot be said to rest exclusively with the corporate bar or the 
increasingly imperious disposition of the judiciary.  Once the field of view 
is expanded, it seems clear that a surprisingly broad consensus (at the very 
least, a convergence of superficially opposed forces) has supported the 
retreat from jury trial and indeed the adversary system as a whole.59 
My purpose in this Article is not to offer a hackneyed plea in defense of 
jury trial and the adversary system.  Whatever might be said in its defense, 
no claim can be made that jury trial is the best manner of resolving every 
dispute, nor even that jury trial is the appropriate default.  Although jury 
trial should remain the yardstick against which alternatives are assessed in 
due process analysis,60 Judge Henry J. Friendly was right that “common 
sense dictates that we must do with less than full trial-type hearings even on 
what are clearly adjudicative issues.”61  The number of disputes that raise 
“adjudicative issues” is so vast as to make trial-type hearings a practical 
impossibility.  Moreover, fully transsubstantive procedural rules drawn 
from trial practice and extended to every dispute would destroy the flexible, 
efficient, and purposive interpretation and application of law in the many 
areas where it is obviously appropriate.  We have always relied upon more 
efficient alternatives in appropriate settings, and quite properly so. 
Instead, in the pages that follow, I take up examples in which sworn 
officers of the court (judges, prosecutors, city attorneys, court clerks, and 
elite lawyers at the DOJ) have responded to bureaucratic imperatives by 
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separating legal decision-making procedures from adversary adjudication 
altogether—practically and conceptually disaggregating due process from 
judicial process.  One may be inclined to dismiss these examples as outliers 
in the otherwise laudable development of dispute resolution outside the 
traditional confines of the adversary system.  The burden of this Article is 
to convince you that these limited cases nevertheless warrant close scrutiny 
because they signal indifference bordering on contempt toward the 
adversary system as well as the associated due process rights of the people 
whose lives are affected.  The problem of vanishing trials, on this view, is 
not that trials are now rare compared to historical baselines or that judges 
seem to believe they have failed in some sense when cases go to trial 
(though this is an oddly prevalent disposition among judges in a country 
that constitutionalized the right to jury trial).62  The problem is that we 
appear to be crossing a kind of cultural threshold in which doubts about the 
virtues of adversary adjudication not only pervade the bench and bar but 
also are converging with larger social forces to affect basic understandings 
about the rule of law and what it means to see justice done.  The 
commitment to due process may itself be vanishing.  If that is true, it raises 
profound ethical questions about the responsibilities and values of the legal 
profession, as well as the kind of legal subject constituted by the avoidance 
of adjudication in court. 
The first example involves the disaggregation of due process from 
judicial process in the legal justification of targeted killing authored by 
lawyers for the Obama administration.  Here, the formal separation of due 
process from judicial process is quite explicit—decisions resulting in the 
targeting of American citizens are made exclusively within the executive 
branch—and is predicated on a remarkable distortion of Supreme Court 
precedent on the Due Process Clause.  The second example is the 
disaggregation of legal process from adjudication in ordinary civil and 
criminal matters.  Here, unlike the targeted killing program, courts are 
directly and continuously involved but on terms that nullify procedural 
rights attendant to adversary adjudication. 
II.  DISAGGREGATING DUE PROCESS FROM JUDICIAL PROCESS 
AT THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
The 2011 killing of Anwar al-Awlaki in a drone strike in Yemen, along 
with his associate and fellow American citizen Samir Khan, is “the first 
time since the Civil War [that] the United States . . . carried out the 
deliberate killing of an American citizen as a wartime enemy and without a 
trial.”63  The incident was widely covered in the news, on law and national 
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security blogs, and in other legal commentary.  Opinion varies on the legal 
and moral implications of targeted killing, though there is a convergence of 
opinion, at least among national security scholars and experts on the law of 
war, that the program, properly administered, is both within the President’s 
war powers and morally justifiable on the principles of just war theory.64 
Critics, and even some supporters of the program, have argued for 
modifications in the process for classifying an individual as a target.  But 
for present purposes, it is Attorney General Eric Holder’s principal 
argument in defense of the program, offered in the spring of 2012, that 
warrants closer scrutiny.  As controversy swirled about the drone program, 
he gave a speech at Northwestern Pritzker School of Law in which he 
insisted that the requirements of due process could be met without 
providing judicial process: 
 Some have argued that the President is required to get permission from 
a federal court before taking action against a United States citizen who is 
a senior operational leader of Al Qaeda or associated forces . . . .  This is 
simply not accurate.  “Due process” and “judicial process” are not one and 
the same, particularly when it comes to national security.  The 
Constitution guarantees due process, not judicial process.65 
There are several notable features of this argument.  The first is that 
Holder’s public defense is consistent with the due process analysis 
presented in the leaked internal legal memoranda concluding that the 
program is a constitutional exercise of executive power.66  The memoranda 
show that DOJ lawyers relied heavily on Mathews v. Eldridge67 and Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld68 to conclude that due process does not require judicial review 
notwithstanding the fact that the interests of the individual affected by the 
government’s contemplated course of action are at their peak (as they surely 
are when the government action is life threatening).69  At a time of war, the 
lawyers reasoned, the government’s interest prevails as long as the 
individual presents an “imminent” threat (where imminence is construed 
broadly to include membership in an organization that is planning terrorist 
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attacks), capture is “infeasible,” and “applicable law of war principles” are 
observed.70 
One might come to different conclusions about how to weigh the 
interests of the individual, the interests of the government, and the risk of 
error in the government’s internal deliberations on imminence and 
feasibility.  And, of course, one might have concerns about the separation of 
powers implications of secret deliberations taking place entirely within the 
military and national security apparatus of the executive branch, or, 
alternatively, the consequences of exposing such deliberations in an Article 
III court.  For present purposes, the important thing is that both the 
Mathews balancing test and the idea that due process and judicial process 
are not the same have deep roots in New Deal hostility to the adversary 
system and confidence in technocratic expertise.71  At the same time, the 
conjunction of these two ideas in Holder’s defense of targeted killing takes 
aversion to judicial resolution of disputes far beyond the NLRB’s decision 
to eschew formal rulemaking and submerge its policies in the facts of 
individual enforcement actions.72 
Consider the procedural design of legal decision making in the drone 
program:  there are lawyers in the mix of agency deliberation on the 
classification system for targeted killing, but not courts (except insofar as 
earlier published decisions are taken up in the lawyers’ purposive 
interpretation of the limits of due process).  And the deliberation is 
obviously not public as it is in ordinary adjudication by an agency or an 
administrative law judge.  Indeed, the lawyers’ application of law to fact 
turns on almost total deference to secret fact-finding conducted by military 
and intelligence experts.  Moreover, although the “client” these lawyers 
serve is nominally the public, their appointment and removal are contingent 
in no small degree on their fidelity to the political officers they serve.  They 
may pride themselves on their willingness to say “no” when permission for 
a program such as this is sought, but the stakes are so high that the 
cognitive pressures and personal incentives to say “yes” must be significant.  
No one wants the blood of innocent victims of a future attack on their 
hands, least of all those whose decisions might prevent such an attack. 
Notice too that even if they were determined to say no, the Mathews 
balancing test—derived from a series of earlier opinions by the godfather of 
New Deal lawyers, Felix Frankfurter—tilts against trial.73  That is not just 
because balancing is inherently subjective nor because the modern Supreme 
Court has tended to favor the government’s interests (especially in cases of 
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national security) and to doubt the virtues of the adversary system.  It is 
because the core analytic components of the Mathews test are the risk of 
error and the marginal cost of additional procedural protections.74  Courts 
may imagine jury trial as a kind of gold standard when they engage in 
Mathews balancing, but concentrating on accuracy and efficiency, as 
opposed to the broader rule of law values that due process supposedly 
protects (participation, public transparency, dignity, decentralized decision 
making, equality, uniformity, finality, etc.) invites subtraction.75  Attention 
gravitates to the features of trial one can leave out and still achieve 
acceptably accurate results that do not impose undue burdens in time and 
resources on the adjudicator and other participants.76 
The risk of error regarding whether al-Awlaki previously had sponsored 
terrorist attacks as a member of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 
is likely zero given the dossier intelligence officials had compiled by the 
time he was killed.  There are other scenarios one can imagine in which it 
would be much greater, but be that as it may, the trickiest factual questions 
in the legal justification of the targeting of al-Awlaki had nothing to do with 
his guilt (understood in the conventional retrospective sense) or the depth of 
his commitment to AQAP.  Rather, they turned on the imminence of any 
future attack for which his support was material and, crucially, the 
feasibility of capture.77  Whatever one makes of the DOJ’s review process, 
or the fact that President Obama took responsibility for the ultimate 
decision to list individuals as targets, the determination of the dispositive 
facts on these two difficult questions rests exclusively with the relevant 
agency technocrats.  The most important legal judgments will therefore 
almost always be submerged in expert agency fact-finding in an even more 
subterranean sense than in NLRB adjudications. 
With respect to Holder’s specific argument, the turn of phrase he used 
has a long and distinguished pedigree in administrative law and the 
jurisprudence of due process.  It is, on its surface, quite unremarkable, 
expressing as it does the common sense idea that procedures other than jury 
trial can be fair as long as they too vindicate core rule of law values.  But 
use of the phrase in the context of targeted killing squarely contradicts its 
traditional application. 
Running from the very first Supreme Court case to take up the meaning 
of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in 1855, Murray’s 
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Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,78 through a series of famous 
cases decided by the New Deal Court,79 the phrase applied to deprivations 
of liberty or property (not life) where exceptional circumstances justified 
administrative action without providing ex ante notice and a hearing.  
Crucially, in each of these cases, the justification turned not merely on 
exigent circumstances favoring the government’s interest, but on the 
existence and integrity of postdeprivation procedures—most commonly a 
combination of administrative adjudication and access to judicial review.  
No court or legal officer before Attorney General Holder had ever claimed 
that due process is satisfied by a deprivation that, by definition, destroys the 
possibility of the victim’s participation in any postdeprivation challenge to 
the legality of the administrative action. 
Consider the Murray’s Lessee case.80  Samuel Swartwout served as a 
“collector of the customs for the port of New York.”81  Eight years into his 
service, the account he was supposed to keep for his collections was audited 
by the Department of the Treasury and found in arrears.82  A distress 
warrant was issued according to the provisions of a federal statute allowing 
the Treasury to recover funds misappropriated by customs officers.83  
Swartwout’s land was seized and sold by the U.S. marshal pursuant to the 
distress warrant.  The plaintiffs contended (1) that the statute justifying the 
marshal’s seizure and sale unconstitutionally allocated to officers of the 
executive branch “judicial power” reserved to the Article III courts and (2) 
that the distress warrant process was inconsistent with the guarantee of due 
process under the Fifth Amendment.84 
The Court tied these arguments together, framing the issue as whether 
Swartwout “can be deprived of his liberty, or property, in order to enforce 
payment . . . without the exercise of the judicial power of the United States, 
and yet by due process of law . . . and if so . . . whether the warrant in 
question was such due process of law.”85  The Court began its analysis with 
the famous “by the law of the land” language from Magna Carta, 
emphasized that due process derives from this guarantee, and rejected the 
view that due process is whatever process Congress sets out in an otherwise 
lawfully enacted statute.86  Due process must instead be determined by 
examining 
those settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and 
statute law of England, before the emigration of our ancestors, and which 
 
 78. 59 U.S. 272 (1855). 
 79. See, e.g., St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936); Crowell 
v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). 
 80. Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. 272. 
 81. Id. at 275. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 275–76. 
 86. Id. at 276 (insisting that “it was not left to the legislative power to enact any process 
which might be devised”). 
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are shown not to have been unsuited to their civil and political condition 
by having been acted on by them after the settlement of this country.87 
This is a historical test for determining the meaning of procedural due 
process. 
The Court went on to hold that the distress warrant easily passed this test 
because English statutes had long authorized, and her courts long upheld, 
the use of summary process to collect debts on behalf of the Crown against 
“public defaulters” (as opposed to “ordinary debtors”).88  Moreover, those 
practices were well 
understood in this country, and entered into the legislation of the colonies 
and provinces, and more especially of the States . . . .  Not only was the 
process of distress in nearly or quite universal use for the collection of 
taxes, but what was generally termed a warrant of distress, running against 
the body, goods, and chattels of defaulting receivers of public money, was 
issued to some public officer, to whom was committed the power to 
ascertain the amount of the default, and by such warrant proceed to collect 
it.89 
Put simply, government employees charged with collecting or handling 
public funds were regularly subject to summary proceedings to recoup any 
funds they had misappropriated or otherwise failed promptly to report. 
The Court emphasized, however, that this summary process used to make 
the government whole as against delinquent employees was an exception to 
the ordinary presumption in favor of jury trial.  Due process, the Court 
wrote, “generally implies and includes actor, reus, judex, regular 
allegations, opportunity to answer, and a trial according to some settled 
course of judicial proceedings.”90  As importantly, Congress had provided 
detailed postdeprivation procedures to the customs collector in the statute at 
issue.  A collector could oppose the warrant by filing a bill and posting 
bond on the amount for which he was alleged to be in arrears, and the 
statute expressly recognized the right to bring an action in federal court to 
challenge the findings of the audit.91  Even if Congress had not provided a 
federal right of action, an aggrieved collector could sue the auditor or the 
marshal for damages at common law for unlawfully issuing or executing 
upon the warrant. 
With respect to the Article III claim, the Court flatly conceded that what 
the auditor for the Treasury does pursuant to the distress warrant statute is 
“in an enlarged sense, a judicial act.”92  But, “[s]o are all those 
administrative duties the performance of which involves an inquiry into the 
existence of facts and the application to them of rules of law.”93  As the 
Court concluded, “[I]t is not sufficient to bring such matters under the 
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judicial power, that they involve the exercise of judgment upon law and 
fact.”94  Murray’s Lessee thus recognizes that due process is not always 
judicial process, but it endorsed a historical test that measured deviations 
from judicial process according to settled usages, not a balancing test tuned 
to the imperatives of innovation in the administrative state.  As importantly, 
the extrajudicial procedures the Court upheld in Murray’s Lessee not only 
provided for the collector’s participation in postseizure administrative 
review but also for judicial review of the agency action and any ultra vires 
action by the relevant officers. 
The first appearance of the phrase “[d]ue process is not necessarily 
judicial process” is fully consistent with the holding and analytic 
framework of Murray’s Lessee.95  In Reetz v. Michigan,96 the Court 
reviewed the criminal prosecution of a doctor for practicing without 
registering in and obtaining a license from the state of Michigan.97  
Augustus Reetz had mailed a copy of his medical degree to the state 
licensing board, but after he received written notice that his application had 
been denied, he failed to appear at any of the regularly scheduled board 
meetings to prove he was entitled to be certified to practice.98  In the 
ensuing criminal trial for practicing without a license, Reetz argued (as had 
the customs officer in Murray) that the board certification process was an 
unconstitutional delegation of judicial power to an administrative agency 
and that the licensing rules violated due process because there was no 
provision for judicial review of board decisions.99  The Supreme Court 
upheld the process, stressing not only that the board would have granted a 
hearing if Reetz had appeared and requested one but also that Michigan 
state law recognizes mandamus jurisdiction for judicial review of board 
decisions and regularly contemplates application of law to fact by executive 
officers: 
[W]e know of no provision in the Federal Constitution which forbids a 
State from granting to a tribunal, whether called a court or a board of 
registration, the final determination of a legal question.  Indeed, it not 
infrequently happens that a full discharge of their duties compels boards, 
or officers of a purely ministerial character, to consider and determine 
questions of a legal nature.  Due process is not necessarily judicial 
process.100 
Following Reetz, the idea that due process and judicial process are not 
coextensive becomes a common refrain in cases involving the 
constitutionality of the regulatory and welfare state during and after the 
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New Deal.101  In all of these cases, the point of emphasizing that due 
process is not necessarily judicial process is to establish that, although trial 
remains the benchmark of due process analysis, the state may, in some 
instances, act first and litigate later.  It may do so even if the action involves 
an element of adjudication (the application of law to fact).  The agency 
adjudication may occur ex parte in exceptional circumstances.  And, as the 
Court held in the famous New Deal case Crowell, the agency’s fact-finding 
(at least with respect to nonconstitutional facts) may be treated as final.102 
The reason the executive branch enjoys these privileges under the Due 
Process Clause and Article III is not merely that the state’s interests are 
significant, nor that the state is unlikely to err, but rather that its actions 
have the “sanction of settled usage” and any ex ante procedural deficits are 
offset by procedures for ex post review.  Taken in its full doctrinal context, 
then, the formal meaning of the phrase “due process does not necessarily 
require judicial process” is something like this: 
Due process does not require judicial process in advance of a deprivation 
of property or liberty if the method of deprivation has earned the sanction 
of settled usage and is followed by adequate postdeprivation procedures. 
The phrase was never used to justify a complete disaggregation of due 
process from judicial process.  Yet its use in the context of the drone 
program for targeted killing does just that.  The drone program does not 
have the sanction of settled usage (until now, perhaps), and, crucially, it 
destroys the possibility of the target’s participation in any ex post review.  
Indeed, given the Supreme Court’s current Bivens jurisprudence, it likely 
destroys the possibility of judicial review altogether.103 
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The disaggregation of due process from judicial process on these terms—
terms that demand total (and, in the absence of leaks, uninformed) public 
deference to agency technocrats in a program that ends life—thus represents 
the apotheosis of faith in bureaucratic rationality and the New Deal vision 
of technocratic expertise as superior to judicial review.104  It is one thing to 
say on Schmidtian grounds, or on the grounds of some other theory of the 
state of exception, that the law is silent in time of war and therefore that due 
process must give way to national security imperatives and the President’s 
war powers.  Then at least the public knows the true cost of the state of 
exception (death at the hands of the state by extralegal means) and can 
distinguish any deference required under these conditions from the 
deference it might be willing to grant under normal circumstances.  But for 
the U.S. Attorney General to claim that due process is a meaningful 
constraint on a counterterrorism policy that nevertheless tolerates 
procedural innovations unknown to settled usage—innovations that preempt 
judicial review altogether—is quite pernicious.  Due process disaggregated 
from judicial process on these terms is but a paper-thin veneer of legality 
slipped over the iron fist of the state.  Only lawyers supremely confident in 
the technocratic expertise of the national security officials upon whom they 
must rely, confident in the wisdom and restraint of the policy-level officers 
at whose pleasure they serve, and, it must be said, deeply influenced by the 
antiadversarial culture of the modern bench and bar, could defend the 
program on these terms. 
III.  “WHERE IS THE SERIOUS STUFF?”:  
THE DISAGGREGATION OF DUE PROCESS FROM JUDICIAL PROCESS 
IN THE NATION’S MUNICIPAL COURTS 
The justification for the targeted killing program is obviously quite 
distinct from the operation of due process in the nation’s municipal courts.  
Most prominently, judges are absent in the targeted killing program, 
whereas, in the municipal courts, judges are intimately involved with 
prosecutors, city attorneys, public defenders, and private lawyers in the 
design and implementation of procedures for the administration of justice.  
What draws the two quite disparate legal settings together is that, in many 
municipal courts, due process has been divorced from judicial process—
judges are present, but they preside over and promote a systematic evasion 
of formal in-court adjudication (especially trial) on terms that are suggestive 
of contempt for the procedural rights of the litigants who appear before 
them. 
Amy Bach’s book, Ordinary Injustice:  How America Holds Court, 
recounts widespread procedural defects in the country’s municipal 
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courts.105  In Georgia, for example, half-hearted efforts on the part of state 
and county officials to meet the terms of Gideon v. Wainwright106 resulted, 
for decades, in a patchwork system in which some counties used public 
defender offices with barely adequate resources while others outsourced 
criminal defense work to “a part-time lawyer who is hired based solely on 
how cheaply he is prepared to do the work.”107  Over a four-year period in 
one such county, the lawyer who held the contract for indigent defense 
handled 1,493 cases.108  Only fourteen of those were taken to trial, the rest 
were resolved by plea bargain.109  Of 142 cases on the court’s calendar 
during a week when Bach attended, the contract lawyer represented eighty-
nine of the defendants and none were taken to trial.110 
If that seems like a model of efficient administration of justice on behalf 
of clients who have been properly charged with crimes, Bach’s research 
into individual cases handled by the lawyer reveals cause for concern: 
[The contract lawyer] had little time to talk in detail to his clients, and so 
he often had limited information to use in their favor.  It was thus difficult 
for him to bargain with prosecutors to secure a more lenient sentence, nor 
could he produce the ultimate trump card:  a willingness to go to trial 
when his clients claimed innocence.  Many of them risked losing their 
homes, children, and livelihoods if they pleaded guilty, and yet his actions 
remained the same:  His caseload often made it hard for him to clarify the 
facts—for example, whether his client had been the ringleader or had 
acted without intent or was guilty of a lesser crime—which is the kind of 
information that can mitigate the severity of a sentence or get charges 
dropped in negotiation. 
 . . .  Under the weight of too many clients to represent, he seemed to 
have lost the ability both to decide which cases required attention and to 
care one way or the other.111 
Many clients complained that the contract lawyer failed to return phone 
calls; frequently was not in court when his defendants pled; hastily 
discussed plea offers in the halls of the courthouse just before they were 
entered; instructed clients to consult with his paralegal when he was busy, 
without telling clients that she was not a lawyer; allowed his paralegal to 
negotiate pleas with prosecutors; and “rarely” filed pretrial motions 
designed to reveal information about the prosecutor’s evidence.112  In one 
heartbreaking exchange overheard by Bach, a client appeared to have no 
understanding of the implications of entering her plea bargain: 
 “I know I’m pleading guilty,” she said. “But I don’t know why.” 
 “Well, we talked about that,” [the contract lawyer] said. 
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 She shook her head.  No, they hadn’t. 
 “Don’t you remember when we talked?” said [the lawyer], as he 
flipped through a file. 
 “We never talked,” she said, calm and resigned, mocking her lawyer as 
if she knew she would get nothing from him and just wanted him to admit 
as much.113 
In another incident, the lawyer could not identify his own client as 
proceedings began and had to be corrected, twice, by the judge.114 
An investigation by the state bar’s Indigent Defense Committee and 
several lawsuits filed by the Southern Center for Human Rights in Atlanta 
challenging the constitutionality of practices in a number of Georgia 
counties prompted the state supreme court to investigate.115  The findings of 
its Commission on Indigent Defense are jaw dropping.116  One contract 
defense lawyer’s testimony, Bach observes, was 
astounding in its disregard for his clients. . . .  “If [my client is] guilty and 
he admits it [to me] why jerk everybody around with a trial?”  He 
admitted that he didn’t keep records about his cases, saying that “too 
many records just give things for people to come back at you, anyway.” 
  . . .  [H]e seemed not to understand counsel’s role, which is, quite 
obviously, to test the prosecution’s case and mount a defense.  Instead, he 
mused that the true role of the defense lawyer was to assume his client’s 
guilt. . . .  “It’s an error to go in there and assume your client is innocent,” 
adding that, “the vast majority of the time if you’re going to go to trial, the 
client has been lying to you the whole time.” 
 . . .  [He] sounded more like a lawyer from a totalitarian country.117 
Bach notes that the public defender system the state adopted in the wake of 
the commission’s report still left defense lawyers in many counties with 
staggering caseloads.118  She goes on to show that Georgia is not unique 
and that the problem is not simply one of inadequate resources for public 
defenders.  Rather, prosecutors and judges in courts all around the country 
contribute to a system in which guilt is assumed, investigation is short-
circuited, and plea bargains are coerced by setting steep bail, by arbitrarily 
denying indigent defendants access to counsel, and by holding them in jail 
until they accept a plea in order to be released.119 
Bach found, for instance, that a judge who enjoyed widespread 
community support in Troy, New York, was removed from the bench by a 
state oversight commission for setting constitutionally excessive bail, 
failing to ascertain whether defendants were entitled to a public defender, 
and, in some instances, entering pleas on the record without the defendant 
either being present in court or having agreed to the plea.120  When 
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confronted with evidence regarding these procedural errors by the 
commission, the judge reportedly asked his lawyer, “Where is the serious 
stuff?”121  In its decision removing him from the bench, the commission 
specifically emphasized the judge’s indifference toward the procedural 
rights of the accused—the judge failed to “give any persuasive indication 
that he recognized the impropriety of his conduct.”122  Local lawyers 
nevertheless supported the judge, Bach noted, “because the judge did most 
of their work for them, and the community didn’t mind because when 
injustice in the lower courts is ostensibly aimed at keeping the streets safe 
and the system moving, the only people who suffer are the poor and 
neglected.”123 
Bach’s book was published in 2009 and in many of the jurisdictions she 
studied, attempts have been made to correct the worst abuses.  However, 
since the DOJ released its report on the municipal court and police 
department in Ferguson,124 it has become increasingly clear that the 
antiadversarial practices Bach identified persist in our nation’s municipal 
courts and affect the administration of both criminal and civil justice.  
Particularly in regions with falling property and sales taxes, local 
governments have turned to their municipal courts as a source of 
revenue.125  Unpaid civil and criminal fines and fees have been reduced to 
enforceable civil judgments and, in some jurisdictions arrest warrants are 
issued to compel payment.126 
For example, in a recently settled case brought against Jennings, a city 
adjacent to Ferguson, the municipal court effectively functioned as a 
debtors’ prison, generating revenue well in excess of the costs of the 
administration of the courts.127  People were arrested and jailed for failure 
to make payments on financial penalties imposed for minor violations of the 
city’s ordinances.128  The arrests were made without any inquiry into their 
ability to pay, onerous payment plans were imposed (leading to years of 
mounting debt for late payments, interest, and fees), and arrestees were held 
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in appalling conditions in the city’s jail unless they paid up.129  A 2013 
report found that cities in and around St. Louis depended on fines “for more 
than 40 percent of their general fund” and “that the cities most dependent 
on such revenue were majority African-American with large impoverished 
populations.”130  In Jennings, the plaintiffs spent nearly 8,300 combined 
days in the city’s jail over the five-year period between 2010 and 2015.131  
The city, which has a population of about 15,000, “had issued about twice 
as many warrants as there were households.”132 
Many features of the city’s collection system were unconstitutional, but 
two warrant special attention.  First, court sessions were deliberately 
designed to minimize public scrutiny and maximize the intimidation of 
alleged debtors.  The court was in session only once a week for jailed 
debtors to appear.133  Thus, failure to pay automatically resulted in as much 
as a week in jail before being brought before a judge.  While in jail, 
corrections officers routinely verbally abused debtors and offered release 
upon payment of arbitrarily specified sums.134  Weekly court sessions for 
detainees were closed to the public (the courtroom and courthouse doors 
were locked during the “confined docket”); the prosecutor represented the 
city, but no counsel was provided to detainees; people were told that they 
would remain in jail unless they made a payment but were not offered 
alternatives to incarceration and no inquiry was made into their ability to 
pay; and people were not advised of their legal rights under state and 
federal law.135  Toward the end of the confined docket, the courthouse 
allegedly was opened so that debtors who had not been arrested and were 
arriving for the “payment docket” could hear the prosecutor and judge 
“threatening those who cannot afford their debts with longer jail terms and 
sending those unable to pay back to the City jail.”136 
A second significant feature is that the system of fines, warrant, arrest, 
indefinite detention was not employed if a debtor retained private counsel.  
In those cases, the court apparently functioned by the notice and hearing 
standards of procedural due process.  Thus, the court and participating 
attorneys were not oblivious to the requirements of due process.  They 
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knew perfectly well what fair procedures should look like.  They just did 
not believe certain debtors were entitled to those procedures, or, in a craven 
attempt to expand the city’s revenue, they jettisoned those procedures.  Or 
both.  The consequence, in any event, was to disaggregate judicial process 
from any plausible theory of due process of law. 
Squalid jail conditions are not new.  The absence of attorneys for poor 
and low-income people caught up in civil, criminal, and administrative 
proceedings is not new.  Judges who skirt procedural formalities to mete out 
what they take to be substantive justice are not new.  And the kinds of 
cognitive and bureaucratic pressures that cause people of goodwill to 
commit unspeakable injustices are known to us as a matter of theory and 
practice.137  But it is remarkable how long the city ran its courts for the 
extraction of revenue from its citizens and how long the court and attorneys 
in the jurisdiction worked within and normalized a parasitic system that was 
so obviously dehumanizing for arrestees and, concomitantly, for the 
responsible officials.  Indeed, but for the DOJ’s Ferguson report, which 
itself was an outgrowth of street protests in Ferguson, the flagrantly 
unconstitutional practices in Jennings might have continued much longer. 
CONCLUSION 
It may be tempting to dismiss Jennings and the examples Bach describes 
as aberrations largely restricted to the criminal justice system or to the 
points where debt collection and criminal law intersect.  But even in civil 
and administrative courts, where there is no overtly contumacious 
disposition toward the requirements of due process, massive delays and 
arbitrary outcomes raise profound questions about whether justice is being 
administered in a fair and evenhanded manner.138  Here too, crushing 
caseloads, long delays, rushed or circumvented hearings, superficial 
treatment of claims, and rubber-stamping are dehumanizing for litigants and 
officers of the court. 
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Judge Friendly may have been right to ask in 1975 if “we would not do 
better to abandon the adversary system in certain areas of mass justice,”139 
but four decades later we can no longer blink at the hard facts.  The 
abandonment of the adversary system has not been restricted to the areas he 
imagined, and, in many of the areas of mass justice in which he rightly 
called for experimentation, adequate alternatives have not been developed.  
Judge Friendly certainly did not advocate abandoning due process along 
with the adversary system, but the fact of the matter is that it has all too 
often been a casualty of the procedural innovation he advocated and the 
Supreme Court has since endorsed. 
We have thus arrived at a strange moment in the history of due process.  
As the commitment to adversarialism has faded and the formalities of due 
process are brushed aside in ordinary cases, lavish media coverage of 
sensational cases that do go to trial often showcases “hyper-adversarial” 
conduct in court.140  For the lay public, as Bach observes, this helps to 
“reinforce” the myth that the profession’s commitment to due process 
remains “rigorous.”141  If Bach is right, due process and judicial process are 
not only disaggregated in ordinary cases decided in rooms where no 
cameras can be found, that disaggregation is further obscured by coverage 
of procedural decadence in the rare cases that go to trial.  Paradoxically, 
then, the culture of antiadversarialism feeds off of the embers of our 
adversary traditions. 
For the legal profession, unlike the lay public, the disaggregation of due 
process and judicial process is no obscurity.  The culture of 
antiadversarialism and the strange procedures it sustains are a product of 
our collective hubris.142  We are the children of a centuries-long tradition of 
due process and professionalism derived from the adversary system and 
jury trial.  It is a tradition we have mythologized even as we have subjected 
it to withering criticism and set it aside in our technocratic confidence that 
more rational and efficient means can meet the demands of mass justice.  
And we have done so in full knowledge of the constraints (bureaucratic and 
otherwise) that regularly compromise the integrity of supposedly more 
rational and efficient means.  In our own clumsy and well-intentioned way, 
we have become Victor Frankenstein. 
There is no unmaking the monster.  The demands of mass justice are too 
great to permit a broad revival of trial procedures.  But that does not mean 
the traditional link between due process and judicial process should be 
severed and that we should abandon jury trial as the standard against which 
procedural alternatives are judged.  Indeed, as technology begins to reshape 
the capacities of courts and agencies to design alternatives to trial, and as it 
enables law enforcement practices such as predictive policing, the 
connection may be more important than ever.  Nowhere is the promise and 
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hubris of technocratic expertise greater than among those seeking to reduce 
the administration of justice to lines of code. 
The relationship between due process and judicial process is more than 
doctrinal—a connection that courts sustain or weaken when confronted with 
claims that a specific process violates due process and that additional 
procedural safeguards are constitutionally required.  It is a relationship that 
depends upon the profession honoring the underlying ethical, social, and 
democratic values historically protected by judicial process.  This is perhaps 
most important in areas of the administration of justice in which trial is 
infeasible.  If we are to have due process without judicial process, those 
responsible for innovations in the administration of justice must hold these 
values dear. 
